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THE CASE IN FAVOR OF CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
Victor E. Schwartz
Cary Silverman*
In October 2015, Emory University School of Law hosted a provocatively
titled symposium, “The ‘War’ on the U.S. Civil Justice System.” The program
was co-sponsored by the Pound Civil Justice Institute, a “think tank” founded
and controlled by leaders of the plaintiffs’ bar that advocates for expansions in
liability through presenting legal education seminars and publishing papers.1
The distinguished law professors invited to participate in this symposium
generally view tort reform as making it more challenging to bring lawsuits.
Advocates for legal reform unsurprisingly have a different perspective. They
view reform as creating greater fairness in the legal system, reducing
unnecessary costs, and helping to assure sound results for all parties.
The introduction to the symposium edition waxes nostalgic for the civil
justice system of “[a] half-century ago,” which was “a much-admired, wellorganized process for resolving disputes, generally in public, before juries and
independent judges.”2 As this Essay will show, at that time, the nation was in
the midst of the most rapid expansion of liability exposure in its history. Civil
justice reform is an effort, not to turn back the clock, but to achieve balance in
areas where courts went too far in relaxing requirements for both imposing
liability and awarding damages.3

*

Victor E. Schwartz and Cary Silverman are partners in Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.’s Public Policy
Group. Mr. Schwartz coauthors the most widely used torts casebook in the United States, PROSSER, WADE &
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS (13th ed. 2015). Mr. Silverman is an adjunct professor at The George Washington
University Law School.
1 See CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY, MANHATTAN INST., TRIAL LAWYERS INC.: K STREET—A REPORT ON THE
LITIGATION LOBBY 2010, at 9 (2010), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/TLI-KStreet.pdf (discussing
origin of Pound Civil Justice Institute).
2 2015 Symposium—The “War” on the U.S. Civil Justice System, POUND CIV. JUST. INST.,
http://www.poundinstitute.org/content/academic-symposium (last visited May 2, 2016).
3 The focus of this article is on legislative adoption of civil justice reform. State courts also play an
important role in responding to excesses in liability exposure and abusive litigation practices. The adoption of
a “gatekeeper” role for judges in evaluating the reliability of proposed expert testimony, first in the federal
courts, and then in most states, is one example. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993).

SCHWARTZ_SILVERMAN GALLEYS FINAL

2066

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

6/7/2016 4:34 PM

[Vol. 65:2065

I. THE RAPID RISE IN LIABILITY: 1950S TO 1970S
Between the 1950s and 1970s, the civil justice system experienced
unprecedented change, including expansion of liability exposure, elimination
of defenses, creation of modern class action and mass tort litigation, and larger
damage awards. The plaintiffs’ bar proved itself adept at persuading a number
of courts to shift the law to favor increased liability during this period. Below
are some milestones.
1950s: The Rise of Pain and Suffering Damages. Plaintiffs’ lawyers
became more creative in their search for what Melvin Belli—the “King of
Torts” at the time—called the “adequate award.”4 Historically, noneconomic
damages were modest and rarely exceeded a claimant’s economic damages.
Courts typically reversed awards that were larger.5 Mr. Belli and other
plaintiffs’ lawyers changed that. They used a new type of proof in personal
injury cases they labeled “demonstrative evidence.” Rather than rely on the
victim’s testimony, the lawyers used graphic pictures and other nontestimonial means to create in juries a sense of empathy for the plaintiff and
outrage against the defendant. This tactic increased the size of pain and
suffering awards from modest amounts to six-figure awards that sometimes
reached millions of dollars.6 By the 1970s, “in personal injuries litigation the
intangible factor of ‘pain, suffering, and inconvenience’ constitutes the largest
single item of recovery, exceeding by far the out-of-pocket ‘specials’ of
medical expenses and loss of wages.”7
Over time, plaintiffs’ lawyers created an expectation that plaintiffs in
personal injury lawsuit are entitled to large pain and suffering awards, where
there had been no such belief before. They were able to accomplish this even
though pain and suffering awards, unlike economic damages or arguably
punitive damages, are nonfunctional. There is no evidence that a noneconomic
damage award reduces a person’s pain and suffering. However, as Fourth

4

See Melvin M. Belli, The Adequate Award, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1951).
See Ronald J. Allen & Alexia Brunet, The Judicial Treatment of Noneconomic Compensatory
Damages in the 19th Century, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 365, 379–87 (2007) (finding that there was no tort
case prior to the 20th century that permitted a noneconomic damage award that exceeded $450,000 in current
dollars).
6 See, e.g., Philip L. Merkel, Pain and Suffering Damages at Mid-Twentieth Century: A Retrospective
View of the Problem and the Legal Academy’s First Reponses, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 545, 567–68 (2006)
(finding that, during a nine-month period in 1957, there were fifty-three verdicts of $100,000 or more).
7 Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 1971) (citing Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,
443 F.2d 1245, 1249–50 (3d Cir. 1971)).
5
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Circuit Judge Paul Niemeyer has said, “[M]oney for pain and suffering . . .
provides the grist for the mill of our tort industry.”8
1963: Strict Product Liability and Mass Tort Litigation Begins. The
Supreme Court of California became the first to recognize strict product
liability under tort law, allowing plaintiffs to recover for harms caused by
defective products without proving that the manufacturer was negligent.9 The
American Law Institute then adopted § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in 1965, creating strict product liability. Section 402A’s authors, Deans
William Prosser and John Wade, intended strict liability to apply when a
product did not meet a manufacturer’s own design standard (as in, for example,
finding a mouse in a beverage bottle).10 Some courts extended strict liability to
claims challenging a product’s design and warnings, creating both vast,
uncertain liability exposure and litigation.
Around this time, plaintiffs’ lawyers succeeded in extending “mass tort”
litigation, previously reserved for mass disasters such as airplane crashes
where all people involved suffered the exact same fate at the same time, to
cases involving a single product or substance, but with significantly different
facts at different times in individual cases.11 While there can be benefits to
coordinating procedural issues, faced with hundreds or thousands of claims,
some judges adopted procedural shortcuts that placed efficiency before due
process, such as bundling lawsuits and holding joint trials involving multiple
plaintiffs with varying injuries and numerous defendants.
1966: The Modern Class Action Era. A newly-revised Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1966, marking the
current era of class action litigation. Development of class action doctrine in
state courts followed. As University of Arizona Law Professor David Marcus
colorfully put it, “To anyone interested in buccaneering attorneys, maverick
judges, mind-boggling settlement sums, idealistic lawyering, or base legal
corruption, the next forty-odd years have yielded a rich harvest.”12
8 Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of Our Tort System, 90
VA. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2004).
9 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
10 See George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2301, 2320–
22 (1989).
11 See Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story—An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 116, 142 (1968) (discussing Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.
1967)).
12 David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2013).
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The revised rule required plaintiffs to opt out of a class action rather than
opt in. As a practical matter, most recipients of class action notices tossed them
in the garbage, but they became part of “the class.” When settlement time
came, the plaintiffs’ lawyers made a fortune in fees, the defendants bought
peace, and the class members generally received only modest recoveries, such
as the right to obtain a coupon for a product they did not like in the first place.
Late 1960s: Punitive Damages “Run Wild.” American courts began to
depart from the “intentional tort” moorings of punitive damages. Historically,
the common law strictly limited punitive damages to a narrow category of torts
involving conscious and intentional harm in which the defendant’s conduct
was an “affront[] to the honor of the victims.”13 They later became firmly
established as a means to punish the defendant and deter others from similar
conduct, and typically involved situations in which one person intentionally
harmed another. For much of early American jurisprudence, punitive damages
awards “merited scant attention,” because they “were rarely assessed and likely
to be small in amount.”14 Then, states began to allow punitive damages for
reckless actions and even gross negligence.15 The standards fell so low that
punitive damages were “awarded in cases in which liability of any sort would
have been almost out of the question” a decade or two earlier.16 Awards
became highly unpredictable and increasingly commonplace, particularly with
the advent of strict product liability and mass tort litigation. The size of
punitive awards “increased dramatically.”17
By the late 1980s, practitioners observed that “hardly a month [went] by
without a multi-million dollar punitive damage verdict . . .”18 It was not long
before the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that punitive damages had “run

13 Dorsey D. Ellis., Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
14–15 (1982); see also James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived
Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1121–22 (1984) (observing that early punitive damage awards provided
compensation in addition to that which was recoverable at the time).
14 Ellis, supra note 13, at 2.
15 See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Reining in Punitive Damages
“Run Wild”: Proposals for Reform By Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1008–09 (2000).
16 Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment,
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 133 (1982).
17 George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 123 (1982);
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 142
(1986) (recognizing “unprecedented numbers of punitive awards in product liability and other mass tort
situations”).
18 Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of the Use of Punitive
Damages in Modern Product Liability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REV. 919, 919 (1989).
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wild”19 and placed procedural and substantive due process safeguards on such
awards.
1960s–1970s: Relaxation of Requirements for Consumer Lawsuits.
During the heyday of consumerism, states adopted consumer protection laws
that, unlike the Federal Trade Commission Act, included a private right of
action.20 These laws allowed plaintiffs to sue for any conduct that could be
viewed as “unfair” or “deceptive.” They eliminated the need for the plaintiff to
show that that the deception was intentional or that the consumer was actually
deceived, as required under common law. Many of the statutes also authorized
a plaintiff to recover statutory damages, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees.
Congress decided not to provide a private right of action for unfair or deceptive
conduct when enacting the FTC Act both because of the vagueness of the
prohibited conduct21 and concern that “a certain class of lawyers, especially in
large communities, will arise to ply the vocation of hunting up and working up
such suits.”22
In this instance, Congress was prophetic. Those excesses have in fact
occurred under state laws. They can be seen in the surge of class actions
alleging that foods are improperly advertised as “natural,”23 that some
“Footlong” subs are only eleven-and-a-half inches,24 or claims that Red Bull
did not give a consumer “wings.”25
1960s–1970s: Rise of the Regulatory State. Agencies such as the FDA,
EPA, and OSHA received more power and subjected businesses to increased
federal oversight and complex and costly regulations. Businesses that
meticulously follow government standards, however, in most cases remain
subject to tort liability and even punitive damages and civil penalties. The

19 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he frequency and size of such awards have
been skyrocketing” and “it appears that the upward trajectory continues unabated.”).
20 Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54
U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2006).
21 See id. at 13.
22 51 CONG. REC. 13,120 (1914) (statement of Sen. Stone).
23 See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, THE NEW LAWSUIT ECOSYSTEM: TRENDS, TARGETS AND
PLAYERS 88–100 (U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform 2013), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
uploads/sites/1/web-The_New-Lawsuit-Ecosystem-Report-Oct2013_2.pdf.
24 In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., No. 13-02439, 2016 WL 755640
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 25, 2016).
25 See Energy Drink Settlement, GCG, http://energydrinksettlement.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
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result is today’s debate over federal preemption26 and efforts to enact state
laws that recognize regulatory compliance in determining liability and the
appropriateness of punishment.27
1970s: Replacement of Contributory Negligence with Comparative
Fault. Courts and legislatures began replacing the contributory negligence
defense with the more plaintiff-friendly comparative fault.28 Contributory
negligence provided that a person who is partially responsible for his or her
own injury cannot recover any damages in a personal injury lawsuit. Courts
and legislators replaced it with comparative fault, which allows a plaintiff to
recover when partially at fault for his or her own injury, but proportionally
reduces the plaintiff’s damages.29 After adopting comparative fault, some
courts eliminated long-recognized affirmative defenses such as assumption of
risk, the open and obvious danger rule, and product misuse, finding that a
plaintiff’s knowledge, carelessness, or recklessness could be factored into
damages, rather than bar a claim.
1973: Asbestos Litigation, the Nation’s Longest Running Mass Tort.
The modern history of asbestos litigation began in 1973.30 Over the years,
plaintiffs’ lawyers generated asbestos and silica lawsuits through mass
screenings.31 They brought thousands of lawsuits on behalf of people who have
no physical impairment,32 causing a spiral of company bankruptcies and
jeopardizing recovery for those who are sick.33 The asbestos litigation reached
such proportions that the Supreme Court referred to the litigation as a
26 See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Preemption of State Common Law by Federal
Agency Action: Striking the Appropriate Balance that Protects Public Safety, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1203 (2010).
27 See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, Carrots and Sticks: Placing Rewards as Well as Punishment
in Regulatory and Tort Law, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 315, 357–62 (2014).
28 See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal.
1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
29 See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 2–5 (5th ed. 2010).
30 See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding asbestos
manufacturers strictly liable for injuries to industrial insulation workers exposed to their products).
31 See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND, INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE ABUSE OF MEDICAL
DIAGNOSTIC PRACTICES IN MASS LITIGATION: THE CASE OF SILICA 9 (2009), http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR774.pdf; Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s
Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 168
(2003); David Maron & Walker W. (Bill) Jones, Taming an Elephant: A Closer Look at Mass Tort Screening
and the Impact of Mississippi Tort Reforms, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 253, 261 (2007)’.
32 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based
Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 823 (2002).
33 See Mark D. Plevin et al., Where Are They Now, Part Seven: An Update On Developments in
Asbestos-Related Bankruptcy Cases, 13 MEALEY’S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP. 1, 18 chart 1 (July 2014) (finding
over 100 companies have filed for bankruptcy due to asbestos liability).
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“crisis.”34 Some claims were exposed as potentially fraudulent.35 Today, the
plaintiffs’ bar continues to widen the next of asbestos litigation, targeting
businesses with increasingly attenuated connections to the plaintiff’s injury.
Commentators have characterized the litigation as an “endless search for a
solvent bystander.”36
1977: ATLA - From Trade Association to Lobbying Force. The
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (now renamed the “American
Association for Justice” (AAJ)) moved its headquarters from Boston to
Washington, D.C. ATLA, which had acted primarily as a trade association for
plaintiffs’ lawyers became a lobbying force to support liability-enhancing
policy and fight proposals that would reduce litigation.37 Its first victory was to
kill a federal bill that substituted a no-fault system for automobile accidents.
That legislation threatened the basic “bread-and-butter” of the plaintiffs’ bar.
AAJ is now one of the most powerful lobbying groups in Washington,38 posing
an obstacle to federal civil justice reform and at the same time advancing its
liability-expanding mission in both Congress and federal agencies.39
Continuing: More Lawyers, More Lawsuits. In 1950, there were 221,605
active lawyers in the United States,40 or about 1 lawyer for approximately
34

Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, After CSX Settlement, More Trial Lawyers Will Be Sued Under RICO,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2014, 6:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-10/after-csxsettlement-more-trial-lawyers-will-be-sued-under-rico; Jonathan D. Glater, The Tort Wars, at a Turning Point,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/09/business/the-tort-wars-at-a-turningpoint.html; Dionne Searcey & Rob Barry, As Asbestos Claims Rise, So Do Worries About Fraud, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 11, 2013, 5:55 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732386430457831861166
2911912; see also In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (finding that
all but one of 10,000 silica cases aggregated for pretrial purposes were based on “fatally unreliable” diagnoses
and that the claims “were driven by neither health nor justice: they were manufactured for money”).
36 See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Asbestos Litigation: The “Endless Search for a
Solvent Bystander,” 23 WIDENER L.J. 59, 59 (2013) (quoting former plaintiffs’ lawyer Richard “Dickie”
Scruggs).
37 See An Expanded History of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ALTA®)/American
Association for Justice (AAJ), AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., https://www.justice.org/who-we-are/missionhistory/expanded-history-association-trial-lawyers-america-atla%C2%AEamerican.
38 See, e.g., Anna Palmer & John Bresnahan, Reid rakes in $1M from trial lawyers by invoking Koch
Bros., POLITICO (July 23, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/harry-reid-1-million-fundraising-triallawyers-120540.
39 See generally VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ & CARY SILVERMAN, THE TRIAL LAWYER UNDERGROUND:
COVERTLY LOBBYING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform & Am. Tort Reform
Found. 2015), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TrialLawyerUndergroundWeb.pdf.
40 ABA National Lawyer Population Survey: Historic Trend in Total National Lawyer Population 1878–
2015, AM. B. ASS’N (2015) [hereinafter ABA Population Survey], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/market_research/total-national-lawyer-population-1878-2015.authcheckdam.pdf.
35
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every 700 persons in the country.41 By the late 1970s, it was Chief Justice
Warren Burger who warned that “unless we devise substitutes for the
courtroom processes—and do so quickly—we may be well on our way to a
society overrun by hordes of lawyers, hungry as locusts, and brigades of judges
in numbers never before contemplated.”42 While the U.S. population has
steadily grown, the number of lawyers is growing far faster. Today, there are
six times as many active lawyers as in 1950—a total of 1.3 million.43 That is
roughly 1 lawyer for every 250 people.44 It is no surprise that America is more
litigious than ever.
II. THE RESPONSE: CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
Newton’s Third Law of Motion is that “for every action, there is an equal
and opposite reaction.” Civil justice reform is a reaction to the decades-long
relaxation of legal standards. Calls for legal reform grow louder when excesses
in liability adversely affect society, including making it difficult to find a
doctor in some areas, more expensive to get certain goods and services, or
difficult to manage a business or find a job. Legal reform is also motivated by
meritless and frivolous claims that impose unwarranted costs, extraordinary
awards, windfall attorney fees, and lawsuits that appear to serve the interests of
lawyers rather than address an actual harm.
A. State Tort Reform on the March
Constraining Subjective Pain & Suffering Awards. Civil justice reform
has moved at a steady pace at the state level. One of the earliest responses to
the adverse effects of liability occurred in California in 1975, where, in
response to a medical liability crisis, the state adopted the landmark Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA).45 The law limits noneconomic
damages to $250,000 in medical negligence cases.46 Following California’s
41 U.S. Census, Historical National Population Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999 (2000),
https://www.census.gov/popest/data/national/totals/pre-1980/tables/popclockest.txt
(estimating
U.S.
population at 152,271,417 in 1950).
42 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Remarks at the American Bar Association Minor Disputes Resolution
Conference (May 27, 1977), in State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 291 (1977).
43 See ABA Population Survey, supra note 40.
44 See U.S. Census, Population Estimates 2015 (estimating U.S. population at approximately 321 million
in July 2015).
45 See Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665, 680 (Cal. 1985).
46 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997).
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lead, many states have limited noneconomic damages in the healthcare liability
context.47 Several states have a statutory limit that extends to all personal
injury claims.48 These limits range from $250,000 to over $1 million.
Placing bounds on noneconomic damage awards does not affect an
individual’s ability to recover medical expenses, lost income, or other financial
losses. A multi-million dollar award does nothing to ease the pain and
suffering of a person who has suffered a tragic injury. Reasonable limits,
however, are important for preserving access to critical medical specialists,
keeping health insurance affordable and accessible, and reducing unnecessary
defensive medicine.49 Statutory limits also promote more uniform treatment of
individuals with comparable injuries, control outlier awards, and facilitate
settlements.50 When California voters had an opportunity to significantly raise
the statutory limit in 2014, two-thirds of the voters said “no,” and the
proposition failed in every county of the state.51
Providing Procedural Safeguards and Proportionality in Punitive
Damages. Another early reform required “clear and convincing” evidence of
misconduct to support an award of punitive damages.52 This standard reflects
the quasi-criminal nature of punitive damages and falls between the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof used to establish liability in
an ordinary civil case and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applied in
criminal cases.53 States also limited the size of punitive damage awards,
typically to the greater of a fixed dollar amount or a multiple of the plaintiff’s
47 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.549 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-302 (West
2014); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 60H
(West 2000); MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West Supp. 2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60(2)(a) (West
2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.035 (West Supp. 2015); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.19 (West Supp. 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (West 2004); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-32-220 (Supp. 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (West Supp. 2016); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 74.301 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-410 (West Supp. 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-7B-8 (West Supp. 2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West Supp. 2015).
48 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.010 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5 (West
2014); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-8.7 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West 2006); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 60-19a01, 60-19a02 (West Supp. 2015); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (West 2011);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60(2)(b) (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.18 (West Supp. 2016); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 61.2 (West Supp. 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (West Supp. 2016).
49 See Ronald M. Stewart et al., Malpractice Risk and Cost Are Significantly Reduced after Tort Reform,
212 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 463, 466–67 (2011).
50 See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Constitutional Foundation for Federal Medical Liability
Reform, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 173, 192–95 (2012).
51 See Cal. Sec. of State, State Ballot Measures (Dec. 10, 2014) (Proposition 46).
52 See Schwartz et al., supra note 15, at 1005.
53 See id. at 1013.
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compensatory damages. These laws embrace the due process principles of
proportionality and notice. Florida may have been the first state to place a
statutory limit on punitive damages in 1986.54 Today, approximately half of the
states have such a law.55
Turning Joint Liability into Fair Share Liability. A cascade of states has
abandoned or sharply limited joint and several liability.56 Joint and several
liability exposes any individual or business that is partially responsible for a
plaintiff’s harm to liability for paying the entire damage award. The unfairness
of requiring a minimally at fault defendant to pay 100% of the plaintiff’s
damages came more into focus as states replaced the contributory negligence
defense with comparative fault. Since juries could readily apportion fault
between a plaintiff and a defendant, juries could do so among a plaintiff and
multiple defendants. Today, only a handful of jurisdictions continue to apply
full joint liability, and most of those are states that continue to recognize
contributory negligence by the plaintiff as a defense to liability.57
Holding Product Sellers Responsible Only for Their Actual Fault.
States began to respond to court decisions that vastly expanded the liability of
those who manufacture and sell products. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
many states enacted statutes of repose, which end liability exposure many
years after a product is sold or its “useful safe life” expires,58 or after an
improvement to real property is completed.59 Later, many states adopted
“innocent seller” laws, limiting the liability of retailers, often small businesses,

54

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West 2011) (originally enacted in 1986).
See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Building on the Foundation: Mississippi’s Civil Justice
Reform Success and a Path Forward, 34 MISS. C. L. REV. 113, 119 (2015) (citing statutes). In addition,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington do not permit punitive
damage awards or allow them only when expressly authorized for a specific action by statute. See id. at 119–
20 n.55.
56 See
Joint and Several Liability Rule Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N,
http://www.atra.org/issues/joint-and-several-liability-rule-reform (last visited May 1, 2016).
57 These states include Alabama, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts
(limited to proportionate share of common liability), North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia. Alabama,
District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia also retain contributory negligence as a defense
to liability.
58 See Alan R. Levy, Limited Respite Is Found in Statutes of Repose, DRI TODAY, Dec. 2010, at 62
(providing detailed history of enactment of product liability statutes of repose and noting that, in late 1970s,
over half of the states enacted such laws, but that courts struck down several of these reforms as
unconstitutional).
59 See, e.g., AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, STATUTE OF REPOSE: STATE STATUTE COMPENDIUM (2011),
http://www.aia.org/aiaucmp/groups/aia/documents/pdf/aias078872.pdf.
55
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which had no part in designing an allegedly defective product or its warnings,
to negligent conduct based on their own actions.
Removing Roadblocks to Appeal. Appeal bond reform, which took root
in the 2000s, addresses the problem of civil defendants being blocked from the
ability to appeal a judgment because they lack the financial wherewithal to
post a bond covering an extraordinary judgment.60 Excessive appeal bond
requirements may preclude even the largest corporations from being able to
appeal an unjust verdict, forcing settlement regardless of the merits. States
adopted reforms that placed reasonable limits on bond requirements so that
defendants are better able to exercise their right to an appeal.
Other Reforms. Other popular and just reforms in recent years include
providing an immediate appeal of class certification rulings, reducing
excessive rates of interest on court judgments, allowing juries to consider
compensation for an injury provided to the plaintiff from sources other than the
defendant, requiring asbestos and silica claimants to present credible and
objective medical evidence of physical impairment in order to bring or proceed
with a claim, and requiring attorneys to file claims where their client lives or
was injured. States also adopted, through legislative action and court rulings,
stronger standards for admission of expert testimony intended to root out junk
science.
While some states have gradually enacted reforms, others have adopted
comprehensive bills or focused on civil justice reform during a particular
session.
The Plaintiffs’ Bar’s Technique to Challenge Reform. The plaintiffs’
bar has reacted by challenging the constitutionality of civil justice reforms in
the courts under state constitutions, not the U.S. Constitution. State
constitutions offer unique and ambiguous provisions, such as single subject
rules or a right to “open courts.”61 These provisions are open to broad
interpretation. Plaintiffs’ lawyers also invite state courts to read the right to
jury trial, equal protection, or separation of powers under a state constitution
differently than under the U.S. Constitution.62 Through these tactics, plaintiffs’
60

See Mark A. Behrens & Donald J. Kochan, Protecting the Right to Appellate Review in the New Era of
Civil Actions: A Call for Bonding Fairness, 2 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 644 (2001).
61 See Victor Schwartz, Judicial Nullification of Tort Reform: Ignoring History, Logic, and
Fundamentals of Constitutional Law, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 688 (2001).
62 For a recent example, compare Estate of McCall ex rel. McCall v. United States, 642 F.3d 944 (11th
Cir. 2011) (finding limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases did not violate Equal
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lawyers have persuaded several state high courts to invalidate tort reforms.
Since state courts base these decisions purely on state law, as the plaintiffs’ bar
fully appreciates, these cases are not subject to review by the U.S. Supreme
Court.63 Many perceptive judges, however, have not let these provisions be
unreasonably stretched. Most have upheld and respected the legislature’s
authority to establish the contours of civil claims, defenses, remedies, and
penalties.
B. Federal Achievements
Civil justice reform largely occurs at the state level, but in some areas of
national concern, Congress has passed targeted laws designed to address areas
where expansive liability has adversely affected the public or hurt interstate
commerce and thus the national economy.64 At the same time, Congress has
also sought to encourage a wide range of socially beneficial activities.
For example, when liability concerns threatened public health by
jeopardizing access to vaccines, Congress enacted the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. This law created a no-fault compensation
program for childhood vaccine-injury victims funded by an excise tax on each
dose of vaccine. During the 1990s, Congress also limited the liability of
persons who donate food and grocery products to nonprofit organizations for
distribution to needy individuals (Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food
Donation Act of 1996); volunteers who act on behalf of nonprofit
organizations (Volunteer Protection Act of 1997); air carriers and qualified
passengers who provide in-flight assistance during medical emergencies
(Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998); and companies that provide raw
materials and component parts needed for medical devices (Biomaterials
Access Assurance Act of 1998). Congress also protected teachers and
principals who follow school rules from lawsuits (Paul D. Coverdell Teacher
Protection Act of 2001).

Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution), with Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014)
(answering certified question in the same case and finding that the statute, as applied in a wrongful death case
involving multiple claimants, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution).
63 See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Judicial Nullification of Civil Justice Reform Violates the
Fundamental Federal Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers: How to Restore the Right Balance, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 907, 918–19 (2001).
64 Broader reform efforts have not been successful at the federal level, including product liability reform
in the 1990s and asbestos litigation reform between 1998 and 2007.
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When lawsuits based on accidents involving very old planes threatened to
destroy America’s light aircraft industry, Congress enacted the General
Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994. The law created an 18-year statute of
repose.65 It successfully resulted in a revitalization of the piston-driven aircraft
industry and helped create thousands of well-paying jobs.66
In response to reports from families of those killed in the 1996 crashes of
TWA Flight 800 off the coast of New York and ValuJet Flight 592 in the
Florida Everglades, Congress passed the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance
Act of 1996 to restrict lawyers from contacting family members immediately
after a crash.
When a surge of securities-fraud lawsuits against public companies and
accounting firms deterred companies from voluntarily disclosing information
to their investors or shareholders and led to loss of productivity and jobs,
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 and the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act in 1998. These reforms
established important procedural and substantive restrictions on securities
lawsuits, including the creation of a heightened pleading standard that
generally makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to file allegations of securities
fraud without having solid information beforehand on which to base such a
claim.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, it became apparent that plaintiffs’
lawyers were abusing the class action procedural tool.67 Class actions are
intended to make it worthwhile to bring small claims stemming from a
common practice or incident. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, however, were stretching the
class action device by bringing massive lawsuits on behalf of thousands of
individuals nationwide based on different laws and different factual
situations.68 They filed these lawsuits before friendly judges in local courts,
65 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-01-916, GENERAL AVIATION: STATUS OF THE INDUSTRY,
RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE, AND SAFETY ISSUES 28 (2001).
66 Id.; see also Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, The General Aviation Revitalization Act: How
Rational Civil Justice Reform Revitalized an Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1269 (2002); Scott David Smith,
Note, The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994: The Initial Necessity for, Outright Success of, and
Continued Need for the Act to Maintain American General Aviation Predominance Throughout the World, 34
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 75 (2009).
67 See John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case Out of It . . . In State
Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143 (2001).
68 See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate
Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483
(2000).
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such as Madison County, Illinois, which became known as “magnets” for class
action litigation. Many of these cases were called “coupon class actions,”
because the plaintiffs’ lawyers often took home millions of dollars in fees,
while the consumers they purportedly represented received coupons from the
targeted company as their recovery.69 Congress responded by passing the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). CAFA’s expansion of federal diversity
jurisdiction moved class actions of national importance from state to federal
court—and the more rigorous application of class-certification standards that
exists in most federal courts.70
III. TODAY’S LEGAL REFORM PRIORITIES
While states such as Tennessee and Wisconsin (2011), South Carolina
(2012), Oklahoma (2013), and West Virginia (2015) continue to make progress
in enacting the types of laws above, today’s civil justice reforms are largely not
the reforms of the 1980s. They respond to new areas of excess and abuse in the
liability system. Below are examples of priorities on the legal reform agenda
both at the federal and state level.
Transparency in state retention of lawyers on a contingency-fee basis.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers are increasingly reaching out to state attorneys general and
other state and local officials to offer their services. In these cases, private
attorneys often develop the innovative theories of liability, approach AGs, and
then litigate the state’s enforcement action in exchange for a contingency fee.
Placing the government’s power to investigate business and bring enforcement
actions in private individuals whose compensation increases based on the
amount of damages or fines imposed raises serious ethical and constitutional
concerns. The history of AGs hiring lawyers and firms that heavily contribute
to their campaigns through no-bid contracts contributes to a “pay-to-play”
culture.71 Such arrangements hurt the public, since a significant portion of the
recovery that would have otherwise gone to the state had the government
pursued the action with its own attorneys, goes to a few private lawyers. For
69 See Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s Clothes of Class
Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343 (2005).
70 The plaintiffs’ bar has worked to weaken CAFA’s impact by exploiting and expanding several
exceptions and loopholes in the law. See John Beisner, Jessica Miller & Jordan Schwartz, A Roadmap For
Reform: Lessons From Eight Years of The Class Action Fairness Act (U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform
2013), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/A_Roadmap_For_Reform_pages_web.pdf.
71 See Eric Lipton, Lawyers Create Big Paydays by Coaxing Attorneys General to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/us/politics/lawyers-create-big-paydays-by-coaxing-attorneysgeneral-to-sue-.html.
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these reasons scholarship,72 think tank papers,73 reports,74 congressional
testimony,75 and the mainstream media have widely criticized state hiring of
outside counsel on a contingency-fee basis.76
To address concern with state retention of private attorneys on a
contingency-fee basis, since 2010, fifteen state legislatures have adopted
safeguards providing for transparency in government hiring and payment of
outside counsel, and adopting a sliding scale for fee awards.77 Some state laws
go further to protect the legislature’s appropriation authority by requiring the
AG to obtain legislative approval before retaining an attorney on a
contingency-fee basis.78
Asbestos trust transparency. As a result of asbestos-related bankruptcies,
60 trusts collectively hold over $30 billion to pay for harms caused by former
insulation defendants.79 The asbestos litigation has morphed into a two-tiered
system of bankruptcy trust claims and tort claims against still-solvent
defendants. The lack of transparency between these two systems has led to
abuse.80 For example, in a January 2014 ruling involving Garlock Sealing
72 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: Constitutional and
Political Implications, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77 (2010).
73 See, e.g., CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY, MANHATTAN INST., TRIAL LAWYERS, INC.—ATTORNEYS GENERAL:
A REPORT ON THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN STATE AGS AND THE PLAINTIFFS’ BAR 2011 (2011),
http://www.triallawyersinc.com/TLI-ag.pdf.
74 See BERNARD NASH ET AL., PRIVATIZING PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT: THE LEGAL, ETHICAL AND DUEPROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINGENCY-FEE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (U.S. Chamber Inst.
for Legal Reform 2013), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/PublicInterestPrivate
Profit_FINAL.pdf.
75 See Contingency Fees and Conflicts of Interest in State AG Enforcement of Federal Law, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 12–14 (2012)
(statement of the Hon. Bill McCollum, Partner, SNR Denton); id. (statement of James R. Copeland, Dir., Ctr.
for Legal Policy, Manhattan Inst.).
76 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 71; Editorial, The Pay-to-Sue Business, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2009, 12:01
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123984994639523745.
77 See ALA. CODE § 41-16-72; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-4801; S.B. 204 (Ark. 2015) (to be codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 25-16-714); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.0155; IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-3-2.5; IOWA CODE § 23B.1; LA.
REV. STAT. §§ 42:262, 49:259; MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 7-5-5, -5-8, -5-21, -5-39; MO. REV. STAT. §§ 34.376,
34.378, 34.380; S.B. 244 (Nev. 2015) (to be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 228); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-9.2;
S.B. 38 (Ohio 2015) (to be codified at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.49 et seq.); UTAH CODE § 63G-6a-106; H.B.
4007, Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016) (amending W. VA. CODE §§ 5-3-3, 5-3-4); WIS. STAT. §§ 14.11, 20.9305.
78 See H.B. 799, Reg. Sess. (La. 2014).
79 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-819, ASBESTOS INJURY COMPENSATION: THE ROLE AND
ADMINISTRATION OF ASBESTOS TRUSTS 3 (2011) (finding asbestos trusts collectively held $36.8 billion)
80 See PETER KELSO & MARC SCARCELLA, THE WAITING GAME: DELAY AND NON-DISCLOSURE OF
ASBESTOS
TRUST
CLAIMS
8
(U.S.
Chamber
Inst.
for
Legal
Reform
2015),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TheWaitingGame_Pages.pdf.
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Technologies, LLC, a federal bankruptcy judge described how Garlock became
a target defendant after asbestos plaintiffs’ lawyers bankrupted the primary
historical insulation defendants.81 According to the federal judge, Garlock’s
participation in the tort system became “infected by the manipulation of
exposure evidence by plaintiffs and their lawyers.”82 Evidence that Garlock
needed to attribute plaintiffs’ injuries to the insulation companies’ products
“disappeared.”83 The judge said this “occurrence was a result of the effort by
some plaintiffs and their lawyers to withhold evidence of exposure to other
asbestos products and to delay filing claims against bankrupt defendants’
asbestos trusts until after obtaining recoveries from Garlock (and other viable
defendants).”84
Legislatures are responding to this gamesmanship by providing defendants
with greater access to asbestos bankruptcy trust claim submissions by
plaintiffs.85 These materials contain important exposure history information,
giving tort defendants a tool to identify fraudulent or exaggerated exposure
claims, and to establish that trust-related exposures were partly or entirely
responsible for the plaintiff’s harm.
Third-party litigation funding. Third parties have increasingly invested
money into litigation. This lending comes in two forms: (1) companies that
promise quick cash to consumers while they await their day in court or
payment of a settlement; and (2) investment firms that infuse money into mass
tort and other large-scale cases, contributing not only to legal costs, but also
plaintiff recruitment and other litigation advertising costs, in return for a
portion of any recovery. Both types of arrangements have negative
consequences.
The first variant takes advantage of the most vulnerable people, often
subjecting them to exorbitant interest rates and fees that may leave them with
little, if any, recovery after taking a relatively small loan.86 Rates charged by
81

In re Garlock Sealing Tech., LLC, 504 B.R. 71 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
Id. at 82.
83 Id. at 84.
84 Id.
85 Texas, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Wisconsin have adopted
legislation providing a mechanism to require plaintiffs to file and disclose their trust claims before trial.
Proposed federal legislation also addresses this area. See Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering
Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2016, H.R. 1927, 114th Cong. § 3 (2016).
86 See Ashby Jones, Loan & Order: States Object to ‘Payday’ Lawsuit Lending, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28,
2013, 7:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324743704578446903171978648 (reporting
that some plaintiffs’ lawyers agree that lawsuit loans should be subject to closer oversight); Febe Zepeda &
82
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lenders often exceed 100% annually, according to a review by the New York
Times and the Center for Public Integrity.87 Some states are taking action by
limiting interest rates, requiring disclosure of information to consumers, and
adopting other safeguards.88
The second variant can prolong questionable litigation, inject a third party
with its own financial interests into litigation-related decisions, and pose an
obstacle to settlement.89 At minimum, requiring disclosure of third-party
investments in litigation would begin to address the inherent risks of these
arrangements.
Class action abuse. While CAFA has helped provide a neutral federal
forum for multi-state class actions and eliminated “coupon” recovery for
consumers in federal courts, new abuses have emerged. Lawyers often sue on
behalf of classes so broad that they include people who have experienced no
injury—they had no problem with the product at issue, were not influenced by
labeling or an advertisement that lawyers claim was misleading, or otherwise
experienced no financial loss from the allegedly improper practice at issue.90
These “no injury” claims are lucrative for the lawyers who bring them, often
with the aid of hired-gun experts that develop creative theories of damages as a
substitute for an actual loss. But consumers, who typically are offered the
opportunity to file paperwork for a nominal sum, view them as worthless.91

Baldomero Garza, Opinion: How ‘Lawsuit Lending’ Is Putting Families at Risk, NBC LATINO (Oct. 7, 2013,
5:00
AM),
http://nbclatino.com/2013/10/07/opinion-lawsuit-funders-offer-empty-promise-in-predatorylending/ (discussing abusive practices employed by lawsuit lenders).
87 See Binyamin Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/business/17lawsuit.html.
88 See, e.g., S.B. 882, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-57109 (West 2016)); H.B. 1127, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016) (to be codified at IND. CODE
ANN. § 24-4.5-1-201.1); S.B. 1360, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014) (codified at TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 47-51-101 (West Supp. 2016)).
89 See JOHN H. BEISNER & GARY A. RUBIN, STOPPING THE SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO
REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS IN LITIGATION (U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform 2012),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TPLF_Solutions.pdf; see also Alison Frankel, The
Dubious Business of Investing in Mass Torts, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2016/04/18/the-dubious-business-of-investing-in-mass-torts/.
90 See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Rise of “Empty Suit” Litigation™: Where Should Tort
Law Draw the Line?, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 599, 628–73 (2015) (examining class actions targeting unmanifested
product defects and advertising where most reasonable consumers were not misled).
91 See Joanna Shepherd, An Empirical Survey of No-Injury Class Actions (Emory Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 16-402, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2726905 (finding that in class
actions meeting certain criteria, most recovery went to pay attorney’s fees or was distributed to outside groups
as unclaimed funds, while consumers received little benefit).

SCHWARTZ_SILVERMAN GALLEYS FINAL

2082

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

6/7/2016 4:34 PM

[Vol. 65:2065

A recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling reaffirming that Article III standing
requires all private plaintiffs to allege a concrete injury in fact may curb class
actions that allege a mere technical statutory violation that caused no real
harm.92 States are tightening consumer and other laws to require private
plaintiffs who seek monetary damages to show an actual injury.93 Congress is
also considering legislation that would instruct federal courts not to certify
class actions where the class includes individuals who have not experienced an
injury.94
Another area of concern is the archaic Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA), a federal law that has given rise to a cottage industry for lawyers and
serial plaintiffs who take advantage of the statute’s uncapped $500 statutory
damage provision.95 TCPA filings went from 14 in 2007 to 3,710 in 2015.96
Under this law, a business that intends to communicate with its customers or
employees through a phone, fax, or text message, but inadvertently reach
others, is subject to millions of dollars in liability. As Professor Adonis
Hoffman, a former FCC lawyer, has observed, when the average consumer
receives $4.12 in a settlement and lawyers receive an average of $2.4 million,
“[s]omething is wrong with this picture.”97 While the FCC could have clarified
the law to reduce litigation, it instead issued a ruling in 2015 that observers
expect to be a gold mine for plaintiffs’ lawyers.98
Congress should update the antiquated law and reduce the opportunity for
abuse. It can do so through such measures as an aggregate cap on statutory
damages recoverable in class actions, a defense for calls placed to reassigned
numbers, and carefully considering how the TCPA applies to technology that
did not exist when Congress enacted the law, such as text messaging.

92

See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548–50 (2016).
See, e.g., S.B. 315 (W. Va. 2015) (amending W. VA. CODE 46A-6-106 to require plaintiffs to show
proof of “an actual out-of-pocket loss” proximately caused by a violation of the statute).
94
See Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2016,
H.R. 1927, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016).
95 See The Telephone Consumer Protection Act at 25: Effects on Consumers and Business: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony of Becca Wahlquist,
Partner, Snell and Wilmer).
96 Adonis Hoffman, Opinion, Does TCPA Stand for ‘Total Cash for Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’?, HILL:
PUNDITS BLOG (Feb. 17, 2016, 6:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/269656-does-tcpastand-for-total-cash-for-plaintiffs-attorneys (citing data compiled by WebRecon).
97 Id.
98 See Jimmy Hoover, FCC Robocall Rules A Potential Gold Mine For TCPA Lawyers, LAW 360 (June
18, 2015, 7:49 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/669877/fcc-robocall-rules-a-potential-gold-mine-fortcpa-lawyers.
93
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Misleading lawsuit advertising. Americans are increasingly bombarded
on television and the internet with advertising urging them to file lawsuits. A
recent analysis found that lawsuit advertising on television rose 68% from
$531 million in 2008 to a projected $892 million in 2015.99 Such aggressive
recruitment of clients leads to many claims that are meritless. Some may even
be fraudulent.100 Individuals and firms known as “lead generators” use callcenters, some located abroad, to find, trade, bundle, and sell potential mass tort
claims – with the goal of generating so many claims that businesses feel
compelled to settle.101
These advertisements not only generate questionable litigation, but growing
evidence suggests that they may adversely affect public health. Scientifically
unsupported or exaggerated claims that drugs or medical devices cause serious
injury or death may frighten people, leading them to not seek treatment that
would improve their lives.102 Even worse, misleading advertising could lead
patients to stop taking a prescribed drug without consulting their doctors,
posing a risk of harm.103 The FDA, FTC, and state officials should consider
taking action to stop deceptive lawsuit advertising.
Fraudulent joinder. Plaintiffs’ lawyers frequently drag in an individual or
local business as additional defendants in a case targeting an out-of-state
business. Doing so destroys “complete diversity,” thwarting the ability of the
99

See KEN GOLDSTEIN & DHAVAN V. SHAH, TRIAL LAWYER MARKETING: BROADCAST, SEARCH AND
SOCIAL STRATEGIES 2 (U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform 2015), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
uploads/sites/1/KEETrialLawyerMarketing_2_Web.pdf; see also Amanda Bronstad, Ad Spending Up, Defense
Bar Irked, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 27, 2015) http://www.nationallawjournal.com/home/id=1202724543814/AdSpending-Up-Defense-Bar-Irked?mcode=1202615432992.
100 See Anita Lee, Indictment Says Lawyer’s Bogus BP Clients Included Dog, Dead People, SUN HERALD
(Nov. 23, 2015, 9:33 PM), http://www.sunherald.com/news/article41801127.html; David Voreacos & Jef
Feeley, J&J Claims Pelvic Mesh Users Were Solicited to File Cases, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2015, 2:03 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-14/jj-claims-vaginal-mesh-users-illegally-solicited-to-filecases.
101 See Paul M. Barrett, Inside Massive Injury Lawsuits, Clients Get Traded Like Commodities for Big
Money, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-22/insidemassive-injury-lawsuits-clients-get-traded-like-commodities-for-big-money; Paul M. Barrett, Need Victims for
Your Mass Lawsuit? Call Jesse Levine, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2013, 9:41 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2013-12-12/mass-tort-lawsuit-lead-generator-jesse-levine-has-victims-for-sale.
102 See, e.g., Craig Hansen et al., Assessment of YouTube Videos as a Source of Information on
Medication Use in Pregnancy, 25 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 35, 41–42 (2015); see also
Elizabeth Tippett, Medical Advice from Lawyers: A Content Analysis of Advertising for Drug Injury Lawsuits,
41 AM. J. L. & MED. 7 (2015); Daniel M. Schaffzin, Warning: Lawyer Advertising May Be Hazardous to Your
Health! A Call to Fairly Balance Solicitation of Clients in Pharmaceutical Litigation, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV.
319 (2014).
103 See Schaffzin, supra note 99.

SCHWARTZ_SILVERMAN GALLEYS FINAL

2084

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

6/7/2016 4:34 PM

[Vol. 65:2065

out-of-state business to have its case decided in a neutral federal court.
Examples include local store managers, salespeople, retailers, distributors,
pharmacies, claims adjusters, and small businesses that, under applicable state
law, are not legally responsible for an injury. Once the case is remanded to a
state court viewed favorable to a plaintiff, the local defendant is typically
dropped from the case or not pursued. The doctrine of fraudulent joinder
allows federal courts to retain jurisdiction when the plaintiff has no viable
claim against the local defendant. The standard for finding fraudulent joinder,
however, it remarkably high, requiring remand to state court if the plaintiff has
even a “glimmer of hope,”104 and it is inconsistently applied.
Proposed federal legislation would provide a uniform approach to deciding
fraudulent joinder, eliminating confusion and unnecessary litigation.105 It will
also adopt a more realistic and fair assessment of whether a plaintiff has stated
a viable claim against a local defendant and intends to pursue a judgment
against that person.106
“Phantom damages.” Plaintiffs’ lawyers argue in personal injury cases
that their clients should receive damages for medical expenses for the amount
billed by their healthcare providers, even when providers accepted a
substantially lower amount as payment in full. It has become common for
billed rates to be three to four times higher than the amounts paid by patients or
their insurers (including private insurers, Medicare, or Medicaid) due to
negotiated rates, discounts, and write-offs.107 This difference, the amount that
no one ever paid but is sought in personal injury litigation, is sometimes
referred to as “phantom damages.”
As a result, defendants pay significantly inflated judgments and settlements
to reimburse a plaintiff for nonexistent medical expenses. Such damages serve
104

Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 426 (4th Cir. 1999).
See generally Arthur D. Hellman, The “Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016”: A New Standard
and a New Rationale for an Old Doctrine, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. (forthcoming 2016).
106 See Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2015: Hearing on H.R. 3624 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution & Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015).
107 See Glenn A. Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Hospital Pricing And The Uninsured: Do The Uninsured
Pay Higher Prices?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 116, 118–19 (2008) (finding that the charge-to-cost ratio at California
hospitals increased from 3.1 to 3.8 between 2001 and 2005, indicating that hospitals routinely charge, on
average, four times what they actually collect). The list price for a treatment often varies tremendously among
healthcare providers. As a Washington Post investigation found, “even on the same street, hospitals can vary
by upwards of 300 percent in price for the same service.” See Wilson Andrews et al., Disparity in Medical
Billing, WASH. POST (May 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/actual-cost-ofmedical-care/.
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no compensatory purpose. These phantom damages can unjustly place costs on
small businesses and nonprofits that are sued for common accidents such as
slip-and-falls. States have responded by enacting legislation providing that
only amounts actually paid for medical bills, not the billed rates, are admissible
at trial.108 Some state courts have interpreted the collateral source rule to reach
the same result.109
Other civil justice priorities include providing a remedy to those who are
harmed by frivolous claims and defenses,110 and facilitating consistency
between regulatory obligations and the liability system. In addition, civil
justice reform advocates will continue to respond to attempts to restrict
alternatives to litigation,111 misuse public nuisance law to impose liability on
entire industries when legal activities have societal costs,112 or impose
excessive liability on companies that experience a data breach.113
CONCLUSION
Civil justice reform should not be viewed through a trial-lawyer prism. It
does not create unreasonable barriers to recovery. To the contrary, civil justice
reform is designed to preserve legitimate claims while putting a damper on
excesses in the system. As this Essay shows, those excesses are decades in the
making.
When aspects of the civil justice system become imbalanced, society
experiences adverse effects. Businesses cannot expand and grow. Doctors face
challenges when practicing medicine. Innocent people are saddled with

108 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3009.1 (West Supp. 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 8C, Rule
414 (West 2016); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.0105 (West 2014).
109 See, e.g., Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011); Haygood v. De
Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2011).
110 See Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2015, Hearing on H.R. 758 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 44–58 (2015) (statement of Cary
Silverman, Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP).
111 See Hans A. von Spakovsky, The Unfair Attack on Arbitration: Harming Consumers by Eliminating a
Proven
Dispute
Resolution
System, LEGAL MEMORANDUM, July
17,
2013,
at
1,
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/lm97.pdf.
112 See Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Christopher E. Appel, Can Governments Impose a New Tort
Duty to Prevent External Risks? The “No-Fault” Theories Behind Today’s High-Stakes Government
Recoupment Suits, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 923 (2009).
113 See LIISA M. THOMAS, ROBERT H. NEWMAN & ALESSANDRA SWANSON, A PERILOUS PATCHWORK:
DATA PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIABILITY IN THE ERA OF THE DATA BREACH 17–29 (U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal
Reform 2015), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/APerilousPatchwork_Web.pdf.

SCHWARTZ_SILVERMAN GALLEYS FINAL

2086

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

6/7/2016 4:34 PM

[Vol. 65:2065

unrecoverable defense costs. Ridiculous lawsuits and extraordinary awards
take a toll on the public’s faith in the judicial system.
When litigation shifts from helping people to primarily benefiting
attorneys, correction is needed. Civil justice reform makes modest changes to
address patterns of abuse and unevenness in the law. It does so while ensuring
that people receive fair recovery from those who are responsible, that
punishment for misconduct is consistent principles of due process, and that the
civil justice system treats all parties fairly.

